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Negotiation Theory and the Law of Collective
Bargaining
Barbara J. Fick*
In recent years there has been much written, both prescriptive
and descriptive, on the negotiation process.' Little of this literature
has integrated the vast body of negotiation law as it has developed
over the past fifty years under the National Labor Relations Act 2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School. J.D., Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, 1976; B.A., Creighton University, 1972.
1. See, e.g., G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: NEGOTIATION
(1981); H. COHEN, You CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING (1980); C. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1986); M. DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (1973);
H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR (1977); R. FISHER & W. URY,
GETTING TO YES (1981); R. FISHER & S. BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER (1988); P. GULLIVER,
DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1979); J. ILICH, THE ART
AND SKILL OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION (1973); C. KARRAss, GIVE & TAKE: THE COMPLETE
GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES AND TACTICS (1974) [hereinafter GIVE & TAKE]; C.
KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME (1970); D. LAX & J. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS
NEGOTIATOR (1986); R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, NEGOTIATION (1985); NEGOTIATIONS: SOCIAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (D. Druckman ed. 1977) [hereinafter NEGOTIATIONS]; G.
NIERENBERG, THE COMPLETE NEGOTIATOR (1986); G. NIERENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF NE-
GOTIATING (1973) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS]; D. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981);
D. PRUITT & J. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE AND SETTLEMENT (1986);
H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION (1975); G. SHEA, CREATIVE NEGO-
TIATION (1983); J. WALL, NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1985); R. WENKE, THE
ART OF NEGOTIATION FOR LAWYERS (1985); G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLE-
MENT (1983); 1. ZARTMAN & M. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR (1982); 1. ZARTMAN,
THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS (1978); Condlin, "Cases on Both
Sides": Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65 (1985);
Dunlop, The Negotiations Alternative in Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1421 (1984);
Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89
HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976); Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 149 (1983); Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection
in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1985); Gulliver, Negotiations as a Mode of
Dispute Settlement: Towards a General Model, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 667 (1973); Hartie,
Lawyer's Skills in Negotiations: Justice in Unseen Hands, 1984 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
119; Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 31
KAN. L. REV. 69 (1982); Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); Mnookin & Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979);
Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281 (1956).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The NLRA regulates the relationship
between private-sector employers and their employees and union representatives.
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(hereinafter NLRA), with negotiation theory.' Collective bargaining
under the NLRA has some peculiarities not readily transferable to
negotiation across-the-board; there are enough similarities, how-
ever, that a consideration of the law of collective bargaining can
provide some valuable insights and lessons on negotiation theory
and process.
The study of negotiation involves either the substance of the
negotiation (the issues to be discussed and resolved), or the ne-
gotiation procedure (the tactics and strategies used by the parties
in discussing and resolving the issues). The NLRA regulates both
aspects of collective bargaining to some degree.
Section 8(d) of the NLRA lists those issues on which labor and
management must bargain (the substance of negotiation): "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 4 The
National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter the NLRB or Board)
and the courts have given content and meaning to that phrase by
specifying particular issues over which the parties must bargain.,
Further, the NLRA requires the parties to engage in "collective
bargaining" (the process of negotiation) over these enumerated
substantive issues .6
The NLRA is also concerned with negotiation procedure. Col-
lective bargaining "involves more than the holding of conferences
and the exchange of pleasantries." 7 The Board and the courts have
recognized that, to be effective, bargaining requires adherence to
3. An exception is the classic work by Carl Stevens, STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING NEGOTIATION (1963), in which the author describes the legal limits of collective
bargaining and then examines the parties' development of strategy within those limits.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
5. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342 (1958); NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952) (bonus
payments); W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949) (health insurance);
Great S. Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 652 (1942)
(vacations); Schraffts Candy Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 581 (1979) (plant rules); Smith Cabinet
Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964) (shift differential payments); Braswell Motor Freight
Lines, 141 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1963), enforced per curiam sub nom. Teamsters Local Union
745 v. NLRB, 370 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (overtime payments); Inland Steel Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949)
(pensions).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5),-(b)(3) (1982).
7. Connecticut Coke Co., No. 265, Decisions of the Nat'l Labor Bd. pt. 2 at 88, 89
(1934). This is a pre-NLRB decision issued by the National Labor Board that was responsible
for administering § 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. This section gave
employees the right "to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing," similar to the right conferred under the NLRA. National Industrial Recovery
Act of 1933, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198.
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certain procedural standards.' The development of these procedural
principles provides useful guidance in defining the process and
elements essential not only to labor relations, but to negotiation
in general.
This Article focuses on the procedural aspects developed under
the NLRA in defining the concept of collective bargaining and
discusses their applicability to a general theory of negotiation.
I. THE STATUTORY DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH
In passing the NLRA in 1935, 9 Congress protected employees'
rights to form and join labor organizations for the purpose of
collective bargaining with their employers; I0 moreover, Congress
imposed on employers the duty "to bargain collectively with the
representatives of [their] employees."" As a result, an entire body
of law has developed around the concept of collective bargaining.
The NLRA is the only statute that systematically and comprehen-
sively regulates the negotiation process 12 by providing legal guid-
ance for determining the structure of negotiation. 3 The NLRA
imposes specific requirements on the negotiators, and proscribes
specific types of behavior.
As initially enacted, the NLRA did not contain a definition of
the term collective bargaining. As recognized by the Board in its
8. See generally Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 248 (1964); Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV.
988 (1961); Gross, Cullen & Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and
Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (1968).
9. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)).
10. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, to join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection ..... Id., § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157).
I1. Id. § 8(5), 49 Stat. 453 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)).
12. There are some other areas in the law where certain aspects of negotiation are
regulated. For example, securities law prohibits untrue statements of material fact and
mandates disclosure of material facts necessary to preclude misrepresentation in the purchase
and sale of securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5) (1987). See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a),-(g),
2306(a), (f), 2311 (1982) (disclosure requirements for procurement contracts); 15 U.S.C. §§
1701-1720 (1982) (interstate sale of land contracts). These legal restraints are mainly aimed
at preventing fraud, however, and do not concern the process of negotiation itself.
13. Much of the literature discussing negotiation theory and structure is grounded in
the social sciences. See, e.g., THE DISPUTING PROCESS - LAW IN TEN SOCIETtES (L. Nader
& H. Todd ed. 1978); E. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION (1969); NEGOTIATIONS, supra
note 1; J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, supra note 1; J. VON NEUMAN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY
OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). An examination of the NLRA provides a legal
perspective on the negotiation process.
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first Annual Report, however, "Collective bargaining is something
more than the mere meeting of an employer with the representative
of his employees; the essential thing is rather the serious intent to
adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground.'1 4
Thus, the bargainer's subjective intent, which must be inferred
from circumstantial evidence, is key to determining whether the
bargaining obligation has been fulfilled. The Board considers the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the negotiators' behavior
at the bargaining table as indicative of their subjective good faith
intent to reach agreement. 1" The factors considered in evaluating
the totality of the circumstances include statements made by the
negotiator, bargaining history, the proposals presented, willingness
to grant concessions, and justifications for rejecting proposals
presented by the other party. 6 The Board, in evaluating these
factors, attempts to determine whether a negotiator "went through
the motions of negotiation as an elaborate pretense with no sincere
desire to reach an agreement if possible, or that it bargained in
good faith but was unable to arrive at an acceptable agree-
ment ... ."'7
Much of this evaluation requires an analysis of the terms dis-
cussed during bargaining. For instance, proposing and insisting
upon terms predictably unacceptable to the other party 8 or failing
to find anything acceptable in an ordinary labor contract 9 can
evidence intent not to reach agreement. This type of evaluation is
labor law specific, and therefore requires a knowledge of terms a
union or employer would consider acceptable or outrageous, as
well as some familiarity with the content of standard labor con-
tracts.
Apart from the issue of the parties' subjective intent, the Board
also developed required procedural guidelines to establish condi-
14. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 85 (1936).
15. E.g., NLRB v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 365 F.2d 321, 322 (5th Cir. 1966);
Skrl Die Casting, 245 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1049 (1979), modified on other grounds, 651 F.2d
1218 (6th Cir. 1981); Tomco Communications, 220 N.L.R.B. 636, 637 (1975), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 567 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978).
16. E.g., Southside Elec. Coop., 247 N.L.R.B. 705, 707-08 (1980); Collins & Aikman
Corp., 165 N.L.R.B. 678 (1967), enforced, 395 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1968); McCulloch Corp.,
132 N.L.R.B. 201, 215-16 (1961); Marden Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1338 (1953),
modified on other grounds, 217 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 981 (1955).
17. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953).
18. E.g., Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 334, 338 (1966); "M" System,
Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 527, 547 (1960).
19. Reed & Prince, 205 F.2d at 134.
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tions conducive to reaching agreement.20 Failure to abide by these
bargaining procedures impedes the bargaining process and consti-
tutes a repudiation of the basic concept of bargaining. Unlike the
Board's substantive evaluations, these procedural guidelines are
not labor law specific but rather relate to the fundamental prin-
ciples of the negotiation process. The remainder of this Article
will focus on these guidelines.
Subsequently, Congress' amendment of the NLRA in 194721
defined collective bargaining to include several procedural require-
ments in addition to explicitly imposing a "good faith" test.
Section 8(d) of the NLRA defines collective bargaining as follows:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment ... and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession .... 11
The procedural requirements listed, such as the duty to meet at
reasonable times and to execute a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached, have not been viewed as exhaustive or
exclusive. Rather, the Board and the courts have built upon this
foundation in formulating procedural rules designed to facilitate
the process of collective bargaining.
Thus, in trying to give content to the concept of bargaining, the
Board and the courts have developed both contextual indicia of
the subjective good faith of the bargainers and procedural criteria
for the essential elements of the bargaining process. "Good-faith
bargaining thus involves both a procedure for meeting and nego-
tiating, which may be called the externals of collective bargaining,
and a bona fide intention, the presence or absence of which must
be discerned from the record." 23
20. E.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965) ("Merely meeting
and conferring without a prior exchange of requested data, where such is relevant, does
not facilitate effective collective bargaining and, therefore, ...a refusal to furnish data is
an unfair labor practice notwithstanding the good faith of the employer in rejecting the
request." Id. at 68); B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 161 (1967), enforced per
curiam, 410 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969) ("Wholly apart from
any consideration of Respondents' intent, the evidence reveals that Respondents did not
display the degree of diligence [in scheduling meetings] the proper performance of its
bargaining obligations required." B.F. Diamond, 163 N.L.R.B. at 175.).
21. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-197 (1982)).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
23. General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 194 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
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It is important to emphasize that failure to reach an agreement
is not an indicator of lack of good faith. The NLRA explicitly
recognizes that parties may negotiate in complete good faith yet
may be unable to agree to a proposal or concede their positions.2 4
The procedural criteria imposed by the NLRA are designed to
help the negotiation process work effectively and to ensure that
the parties are interested in reaching an agreement; they will not,
however, guarantee that an agreement is reached.2 5
A consideration of these procedural criteria, considered essential
for good-faith bargaining in labor law, can be useful for developing
a theory concerning behavior necessary for any effective negotia-
tion to occur.
II. LAW AND THEORY: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEORETICAL
SUPPORT
A. To Meet at Reasonable Times
The statutory admonition "to meet at reasonable times ' 26 en-
compasses two distinct procedural criteria-the concepts of method
and time.
Parties may negotiate by three basic methods: in person, by
telephone, and by written correspondence. In the course of any
single negotiation, all three methods may be utilized to bargain
and to reach agreement. The statutorily preferred method, how-
ever, is "to meet," which has been interpreted as requiring in-
person negotiation.
7
"It is elemental that collective bargaining is most effectively
carried out by personal meetings and conferences of parties at the
bargaining table," ' 28 and the requirements of section 8(d) are "not
satisfied by merely inviting the union to submit any proposition
24. The obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession .... 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
25. "Discussion conducted under that standard of good faith may narrow the issues,
making the real demands of the parties clearer to each other, and perhaps to themselves,
and may encourage an attitude of settlement through give and take." NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960). Still, "[tihe Act does not compel any
agreement whatsoever ...." NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
27. E.g., Fountain Lodge, Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 674, 675 (1984); Alle Arecibo Corp.,
264 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1273 (1982); Case, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 798, 814 (1978), modified, 653
F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1981); Rasco Olympia, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 894, 897 (1970).
28. United States Cold Storage Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1108 (1951), enforced, 203
F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953).
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they may have in writing where either party seeks a personal
conference." ' 29 Neither the NLRA nor case law prohibits the use
of the other methods; it is recognized, however, that bargaining
by telephone or mail is not as effective as face-to-face negotiation.
The inherent delay in written correspondence can frustrate rather
than facilitate agreement. Although the telephone allows immediate
verbal communication and response, the possibility of exchanging
written documents and proposals is hindered. Negotiation in per-
son, on the other hand, constitutes the optimal method for effec-
tuating both communication and agreement. The parties can react
to nonverbal as well as verbal signals, and they can share and
exchange written documentation.
The superiority of communication in person as a negotiation
method is also acknowledged by writers outside the field of labor
law. In the 17th century, Sir Francis Bacon considered the issue
of communication methods used in the negotiation process in his
essay "Of Negotiating. "30
It is generally better to deale by Speech, then by Letter; And by the
Mediation of a Third, then by a Mans Selfe. Letters are good, when a
Man would draw an Answer by Letter backe againe; Or when it may
serve, for a Mans lustification, afterwards to produce his owne Letter;
Or where it may be Danger to be interrupted, or heard by Peeces. To
deale in Person is good, when a Mans Face breedeth Regard, as
Commonly with Inferiours; Or in Tender Cases, where a Mans Eye,
upon the Countenan~e of him with whom he speaketh, may give him a
Direction, how farre to goe: And generally, where a Man will reserve
to himselfe Libertie, either to Disavow, or to Expound.'
This early recognition of the importance of nonverbal clues in
giving meaning to communication and thereby facilitating negoti-
ation continues to be emphasized. Erving Goffman's classic work
Strategic Interaction discusses the concept of "framing" commu-
nication.12 The content of a message is not merely the words used
(their semantic character), but also the way the words are conveyed
(their expressive character). Paralinguistic clues such as facial
expression, intonation, and gestures, which are observable in face-
to-face interaction, provide a "frame" for the communication that
adds meaning to the words used.33
29. NLRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1953),
enforcing, 96 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1951), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953).
30. F. BACON, Of Negotiating, in BACON'S ESSAYS AND COLOURS OF GOOD AND EVIL
195 (rev. reprint 1972) (1862).
31. Id.
32. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 13, at 7-9.
33. Id. See also D. TANNEN, THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEANT! 82-100 (1986) (discussing
the concept of framing-how it works and how it affects communication).
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Clarity of communication is an important element of negotiation.
Parties desirous of reaching agreement will select the method of
communication most likely to create clarity. Accordingly, labor
law holds that the willingness to engage in face-to-face negotiation
is a requirement for good-faith bargaining. 34
The NLRA requires not only that the parties meet in person,
but also that they meet "at reasonable times." ' 35 This time com-
ponent refers to the duration of meetings as well as to their
frequency.3 6 What is reasonable will depend on the peculiarities of
each negotiation. 37 A negotiation involving a substantial number
of complex issues would reasonably require more meetings of
longer duration than a simple single-issue transaction.
The principle underlying the time requirement is that where the
parties are sincerely interested in attempting to reach an agreement,
they will meet often enough, and allow enough time to explore
the issues fully and to discuss their respective interests and pro-
posals. "Agreement is stifled at its source if opportunity is not
accorded for discussion or so delayed as to invite or prolong unrest
or suspicion." '3
The use of time as a tactic in the negotiation process is well
documented.3 9 Most of the literature considers the effect of dead-
lines on negotiation. Studies show that deadlines increase the
pressure to reach an agreement, thereby lessening the bargainers'
demands and increasing their concession rates. ° Because of this
34. "That bargaining principals are entitled to face-to-face negotiations with their
opposites is, I believe, an elementary and essential condition of bona fide bargaining ....
Aaron Newman, 144 N.L.R.B. 1582, 1589 (1963).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
36. Waycross Sportswear, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 101, 107-08 (1967), enforced, 403 F.2d
832 (5th Cir. 1968); Beverage-Air Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 1127, 1138-39 (1967), enforced in
pertinent part, 402 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1968).
37. See, e.g., B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 161, 174-75 (1967), enforced
per curiam, 410 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969); Little Rock
Downtowner, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1305-07 (1964), enforced in pertinent part, 341
F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1965); Radiator Specialty Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 350, 368 (1963), enforced
in part, 336 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1964).
38. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 470, 506 (1949). See also Brown, De-
Androde, Hurvich, McDaritt, Shortell, Slichter, Stanton, Ulrich & Wall, Report to the
Governor of Massachusetts on Labor-Management Relations, I INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
110 (1947) [hereinafter Report to the Governor], ("Stalling by one side or another gives
rise to antagonisms." Id. at 112.).
39. GIVE & TAKE, supra note 1, at 44-46; R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 1,
at 151-55; D. PRUITT, supra note 1, at 46-55, 73-74; H. RAIFFA, supra note 1, at 78-85; J.
RUBIN & B. BROWN, supra note 1, at 120-24; J. WALL, supra note 1, at 117.
40. See J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, supra note 1, at 120-24; C. STEVENS, supra note 3, at
45-52; Pruitt & Drews, The Effect of Time Pressure, Time Elapsed, and the Opponent's
Concession Rate on Behavior in Negotiation, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 43
(1969).
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deadline effect, parties commonly may begin bargaining months
in advance of a contract expiration deadline and meet with rea-
sonable frequency for reasonable duration, yet they will not reach
agreement until the deadline approaches.
It is not the deadline effect alone, however, that produces
agreement in such cases. The frequency and duration of meetings
preceding the deadline allow the parties to make exploratory offers
and proposals and to exchange or obtain information for evaluating
offers. When the deadline approaches, the parties are then in a
position to announce their final concessions and to evaluate the
credibility of the respective announcements. 4 ' A deadline alone,
without the precedent time to negotiate, will cause an exchange of
take-it-or-leave-it offers just as likely to produce a breakdown in
negotiation as an agreement. 42 Thus, a requirement that bargainers
meet reasonably frequently and for periods of time reasonably
necessary to discuss and explore the issues involved enhances the
prospect that agreement will be reached when the deadline arrives.
B. The Authority of the Negotiator
Most negotiations carried on in the legal arena are conducted
by agents on behalf of principals. In labor relations, the union
business agent negotiates for the membership of the local union
while the plant manager negotiates for the company. When settling
a lawsuit, lawyers negotiate on behalf of their respective clients.
Those engaged in the actual give-and-take of the negotiation proc-
ess are usually not acting on their own behalf, but in the interests
of an absent, or at least nonparticipating, third party. As in any
principal-agent relationship, questions arise concerning the extent
of the agent's authority to act on behalf of, and to legally bind,
the principal. 43
A principal can generally vest his negotiating agent with three
levels of authority: no authority, limited authority, and complete
authority. In the first situation, the agent acts as an intermediary
or messenger, transmitting proposals to and from the principal
with no ability to independently agree to, or propose, any terms.
An agent with limited authority has the ability to exchange pro-
posals, make concessions, and agree to terms within a bargaining
41. See J. Rubin & B. Brown, supra note 1, at 123-24; C. STEVENS, supra note 3, at
98-107; Kelley, A Classroom Study of the Dilemmas in Interpersonal Negotiations, in
STRATEGIC INTERACTION AND CONFLICT 49 (K. Archibald ed. 1966).
42. See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (discussion on Boulwareism).
43. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 32-81 (1958) (discussion of
agent authority).
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range set by the principal and subject to the principal's final
ratification. An agent with complete authority has the power to
bind the principal to whatever agreement the agent negotiates.
Although all three types of agency-principal authority relationships
are legally cognizable, they are not equally appropriate for use in
good-faith negotiations.
"The bargaining process which the [NLRA] envisages ...con-
templates its exercise by agents clothed with sufficient authority
to expedite consummation.""4 By refusing to vest an agent with
authority, the principal prevents any meaningful discussion from
occurring during the bargaining process. The agent cannot be
persuaded to take any action with respect to the proposals pre-
sented by the other party. The exchange of concessions, an im-
portant element of the negotiation process, is thus inhibited. Using
an agent without authority is an obstacle to effective bargaining.
In essence, the other party is denied the opportunity for face-to-
face negotiations, as the agent is little more than a human mail
box. "Bargaining connotes a meeting between equals and neither
party discharges the obligations imposed upon him by statute by
merely providing an ear to which demands, requests or suggestions
can be made." 45
Although the NLRA does not mandate that the bargaining agent
be given complete authority to negotiate, it does view an agent
who lacks any authority to make an agreement as an indicator of
bad faith on the part of the principal. The lack of any authority
is an impediment to bargaining and therefore indicative of both
bad faith and an intent not to reach an agreement."
Negotiator's authority and the futility of dealing with an agent
with no authority are discussed in the negotiation literature. 47 Most
44. Standard Generator Serv. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 790, 800 (1950), enforced, 186 F.2d
606 (8th Cir. 1951).
45. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 200, 205 (1953), modified and enforced,
216 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1954), 220 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1955).
46. See, e.g., S-B Mfg. Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 485, 492 (1984); Bedford Farmers Coop.,
259 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1228 (1982); Byrd's Terrazzo & Tile Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 866, 870
(1977); Manor Mining & Contracting Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1059 (1972), enforced, 83
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2409 (3rd Cir. 1973); Jeffrey Stone Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 11, 15 (1968);
M.F.A. Milling Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 1079, 1097 (1968), enforced sub nom. Local Union 676
v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Billups W. Petroleum Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 964,
970-71 (1968), enforced per curiam, 416 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1969); National Amusements,
Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 1200, 1206-07 (1965); see also Report to the Governor, supra note 38,
at Ill.
47. See, e.g., N. JACKER, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES FOR LAWYERS 15-20;
C. KARRASS, supra note 1, at 74-75, 96-99; R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 1, at
224-25; FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 171-74; R. WENKE, supra note 1, at 6-7.
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writers view complete authority as inadvisable, as it can cause a
negotiator to be cornered into giving an immediate response,
thereby losing the opportunity to reflect carefully on the proposals
made.4 8 On the other hand, using an agent with no authority allows
a principal to gather information from the other side without any
correlative disclosure. 49 Such a tactic constitutes discovery, not
negotiation. The frustration of dealing with an agent with no
authority can cause the other party to break off the negotiation.
"[I]f a negotiator is limited in the concessions he/she can make,
the very idea of negotiation is undermined. When negotiation is
understood as the process of making concessions toward mutual
agreement, encountering an opponent who cannot make conces-
sions violates expectations and creates anger." 50
If parties are sincerely interested in reaching a mutually accept-
able agreement, they will vest their bargaining agents with sufficient
authority to effectuate the negotiation process by engaging in a
full discussion and exchange of ideas and proposals necessary for
reaching agreement.
C. Boulwareism, or "Take-it-or-Leave-it" Bargaining
In 1947, Lemuel Boulware, a vice president at General Electric
(GE), devised a negotiation strategy for dealing with the unions
that represented certain groups of GE employees. 1 This strategy
involved an initial extensive market research program to determine
the needs and wants of the employees, as well as the business
conditions, economic trends, and competitive factors shaping the
marketplace. Based on the information obtained, GE decided what
were "fair" employment terms to offer its employees, considering
both the employees' interests and its own, and presented this offer
to the unions as its firm and final offer. GE refused to modify
this offer in response to union arguments, threats, or counter-
offers. The only basis for modification was if the union could
show that the facts on which GE's offer was based were somehow
incorrect or inaccurate. This firm, final offer aspect of Boulware's
48. N. JACKER, supra note 47, at 15-16; GIVE & TAKE, supra note 1, at 74-75; R.
WENKE, supra note 1, at 6.
49. N. JACKER, supra note 47, at 16-17.
50. R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 1, at 225.
51. The description of Boulwareism is derived from the following sources: General
Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 207 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, THE STORY OF GENERAL
ELECTRIC'S 1960 NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE 1UE (1961); Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law
in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 288-89 (1964); Note, "Boulwareism": Legality
and Effect, 76 HARv. L. REV. 807 (1963).
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strategy was combined with a communication program aimed at
convincing the employees that the company had their best interests
at heart and that its offer was a fair one.
The union challenged GE's negotiation strategy as violating the
statutory obligation to bargain in good faith. It characterized
Boulwareism as a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude, contrary to the
concept of "collective" bargaining. In effect, GE engaged in
bargaining with itself-an internal process of analyzing and weigh-
ing competing facts and interests-and then presented the results
of this internal bargaining to the union to be accepted as the
agreement.
The Board held that GE's overall bargaining conduct constituted
a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. 2 Boulwareism is
based on a misconception concerning the nature of the negotiation
process. GE saw the process of discussion, offer, and counter-
offer as a charade engaged in for the purpose of fooling the
employees into believing that the union had extracted concessions
from an unwilling employer. 3 The process was considered a cha-
rade because "the parties have a common (although unstated)
understanding of what the final agreement will be, '5 4 and the
negotiation process merely expends time and effort to get the
parties to that point of final agreement, when they could just as
easily begin at that point by stating their common understanding
at the start. The firm, final but fair offer, according to GE,
constituted such a statement of common understanding.
This characterization of the bargaining process is misconceived
for several reasons. First, it is premised on a belief that the actual
settlement range is rather limited in scope.5" It assumes that one
is able to accurately determine another party's priorities and to
arrive at a "fair" result from the other party's perspective.
6
52. General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. at 285.
53. [GE] disparagingly refers to the "ask-and-bid" or "auction" form of
bargaining as a "flea bitten eastern type of cunning and dishonest but pointless
haggling." Such bargaining, according to [GE's] articulation, allows a union to
appear to get more than an employer is willing to give, though that is often not
the case, and this only serves, [GE] says, to mislead employees into believing
that union officials are useful in ways they are not, thus falsely enhancing the
union's prestige while diminishing that of the employer and encouraging employee
support of union shows of strength.
Id. at 208.
54. Cross, Negotiation as a Learning Process, 21 J. CONF. RESOLUTION 581, 582 (1977).
55. Id. at 583.
56. "[lln real life one cannot recommend an agreement on the grounds that it gives
the same utility to both sides, simply because one can never discover what the utility
functions are." 0. BARTOS, PROCESS AND OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS 55 (1974).
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Indeed, it assumes, at its basis, that one is actually able to
determine another party's interests. However, as the Board em-
phasized, bargaining is a "shared process in which each party ...
has the right to play an active role." '5 7 Listening to the proposals
and arguments of the other side can lead a party to change its
ideas of what is fair.
Participation in debate often produces changes in a seemingly fixed
position either because new facts are brought to light or because the
strengths and weaknesses of the several arguments become apparent.
Sometimes the parties hit upon some novel compromise of an issue
which has been thrashed over and over. Much is gained even by giving
each side a better picture of the strength of the other's convictions.'"
This view of negotiation as a shared process is as valid for
nonlabor bargaining as for labor bargaining. Boulwareism is as
inappropriate for negotiation in general as for collective bargaining
in particular.
An initial problem with using Boulwareism as a negotiation
strategy is credibility. Because most negotiators tend to adopt the
above-expressed view of negotiation as a shared process, they see
a first offer as being "negotiable" regardless of whether the
negotiator says it is a final offer. 9 The offer will accordingly be
rejected under the assumption that another offer will be made.
When a second offer, however, is not forthcoming, the negotiation
process is prematurely terminated.
A second problem created by this strategy is the reaction that
it produces in the other party if it is believed. It deprives the other
party of an opportunity to participate in shaping the agreement
reached, and is seen, in effect, as the unilateral imposition of
terms, thus creating a "victory" for its proponent and robbing
the accepting party of prestige.60 The strategy is also viewed as
arrogant, in that the proponent implies knowledge of what the
other side wants and the ability to determine what is fair for both
sides. 61
Because of the effect of this strategy on the other party, pre-
senting a take-it-or-leave-it offer may result in failure to reach an
57. General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. at 194 (footnote omitted); see also Note, supra
note 51, at 813.
58. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1412 (1958).
59. Hartie, Lawyer's Skills in Negotiations: Justice in Unseen Hands, 1984 Mo. J.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 119, 165, 176 n.200.
60. C. CRAVER, supra note 1, at 127; C. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 35.
61. C. CRAVER, supra note 1, at 127. See also P. GULLIVER, supra note 1, at 138-39
(suggesting that it is unrealistic to think one can know the opponent's preferences and
strengths).
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agreement even when the offer is objectively "fair" to the other
side. 62 A study investigating reciprocity in bargaining situations
found that participants agreed to a small request when preceded
by a large request more often than when only the small request
("fair" offer) was made.63
In any negotiation situation, the expectations of the bargainers
for participation in a shared process should be recognized. The
negotiators must be prepared to engage in a process of discussion,
offer, and concession-making with open minds and flexible posi-
tions.
D. Withdrawing Proposals
The process of negotiation suggests that the parties are working
together to reach a mutually acceptable point of agreement. The
progress toward this goal can be stymied where one of the parties
withdraws from a previously accepted proposal. In such circum-
stances the forward momentum has been stopped and the resulting
retrogression can lead to a breakdown in the negotiation process.
Thus, withdrawing previously accepted proposals runs counter to
the negotiation process. The Board views such behavior as indic-
ative of a lack of good-faith intent to negotiate. 64 When a nego-
tiator "repudiates understandings already arrived at, abruptly
changes its positions without any announced reason, or interposes
new demands not raised earlier, this conduct will destroy not only
amicability at the bargaining table but also the premises on which
bargaining has progressed, and will protract the negotiations and
delay settlement.' '65
The tentative agreements made during the course of a negotiation
may not be legally binding commitments under contract law. 66
62. C. CRAVER, supra note 1, at 127.
63. Hamner & Yukl, The Effectiveness of Different Offer Strategies in Bargaining, in
NEGOTIATIONS: SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 155 (D. Druckman ed. 1977).
64. See, e.g., NLRB v. Midvalley Steel Fabricators, 621 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1980);
NLRB v. Ramona's Mexican Food Prods., 531 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1975); American
Seating Co. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. International Furniture
Co., 212 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1954); United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 1780, 244
N.L.R.B. 277, 281 (1979); Crane Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 103, 113-14 (1979); Brownsboro Hills
Nursing Home, 244 N.L.R.B. 269, 272 (1979); Carolina Paper Bd. Corp., 183 N.L.R.B.
544, 550 (1970); Marley Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 919, 921-22 (1965); Newberry Mills, 141
N.L.R.B. 1167, 1168 (1963); National Shoes, 103 N.L.R.B. 438, 449 (1953), enforcing 208
F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953).
65. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 408 (1976).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1981). Often, when parties engage
in multi-issue negotiations, they set the ground rule that agreements made on separate
issues during the course of negotiations are tentative only, subject to the completion of the
entire negotiable package.
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These agreements, however, are ethically binding on negotiators
as the parties expect that such agreements will not be repudiated
except under extraordinary or changed circumstances. 67 As one
commentator notes, "There is a norm or custom against revoking
concessions. Breach of the custom . .. is, at best, awkward and,
at worst, can cause a breakdown in negotiations. '68
E. Information Disclosure
The importance of information in the negotiation process was
recognized by the Board from the NLRA's inception. "Interchange
of ideas, communication of facts peculiarly within the knowledge
of either party, personal persuasion and the opportunity to modify
demands in accordance with the total situation thus revealed at
the conference is of the essence of the bargaining process." '69
Negotiation is, at its simplest, a learning process premised on an
exchange of information. The parties exchange facts, interpreta-
tions of the facts, interests, importance of the interests, arguments,
threats, promises, and offers. Based on the information thus
received, the parties assess their own and the other's strengths,
weaknesses, preferences, and perceptions. This assessment then
leads the parties to modify their own positions, accept the other
party's offers, and eventually results in agreement, or in the
realization that agreement is not possible. 70
An exchange of information is an essential component of the
negotiation process, creating the conditions necessary for an in-
formed decision to either accept or reject a party's proposals. 71
Thus, while the NLRA does not explicitly impose a duty to disclose
67. See Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F,2d 1055, 1082-83 (1st Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., 584 F.2d 720, 726-27 (5th Cir. 1978); San
Antonio Mach. & Supply Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. 1112, 1116-17 (1964), enforcing 363 F.2d
633 (5th Cir. 1966).
68. Schoenfield, Strategies and Techniques for Successful Negotiations, 69 A.B.A.J.
1226, 1227 (1983).
69. S.L. Allen & Co., I N.L.R.B. 714, 728 (1936), enforced as modified, 2 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 780 (3d Cir. 1938).
70. See P. GULLIVER, supra note 1, at 5-7, 79-80.
71. This development [of the duty to disclose information] has been in part
a response to the realization that certain information acts as the lubricant needed
to keep the collective bargaining machinery running smoothly. It recognizes that
the parties can negotiate and administer a collective bargaining agreement only
when they have available the information necessary to make informed, intelligent
decisions.
Bartosic & Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-A Study
of the Interplay of Administrative and Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 23,
23 (1972).
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information, the Board and the courts have interpreted the re-
quirement of good faith as embodying the obligation to furnish
information necessary and relevant to the negotiation. 72 The chances
for a successful negotiation are enhanced when the process is
fueled by informed discussion rather than by ignorance and de-
ceit. 73
The disclosure of information is viewed as so important to the
negotiation process that the Board and courts have imposed a duty
to disclose unrelated to the presence or absence of subjective good
faith. "Merely meeting and conferring without a prior exchange
of requested data, where such is relevant, does not facilitate
effective collective bargaining and, therefore, . . . a refusal to
furnish data is an unfair labor practice notwithstanding the good
faith of the employer in rejecting the request." ' 74 Disclosing infor-
mation is necessary so that the negotiator can intelligently discuss
the issues raised in negotiation,75 consider the other side's argu-
ments, 76 develop reasonable bargaining proposals, 77 and determine
when to make concessions.7 1
Access to information is not limited to those facts necessary to
evaluate the other side's proposals, but also includes facts that
would be helpful in formulating and modifying the negotiator's
own proposals.79 For example, where the union is interested in
proposing the establishment of a plant safety program, it is entitled
to information regarding safety hazards in the plant and the
72. E.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
Good faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer
should be honest claims .... And it would certainly not be farfetched ... to
reach the conclusion that bargaining lacks good faith when an employer me-
chanically repeats a claim of inability to pay without making the slightest effort
to substantiate the claim.
Id. at 152-53. See also Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314 (1979); NLRB v.
Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967).
73. Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 248,
280-83 (1964).
74. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1965) (emphasis in
original).
75. See, e.g., Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1297 (1942), modified, 131 F.2d
485 (7th Cir. 1942).
76. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 407, 409 (1951), rev'd on
other grounds, 196 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1952).
77. See, e.g., Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. Div., Litton Sys., 283 N.L.R.B. 973
(1987), rev'd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1989).
78. Rototype Div., Pertec Computer Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (June 30, 1987).
79. "[Tlhe Union sought additional relevant information with which it could determine
the meaning of the information already provided and develop reasonable bargaining
proposals." Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. Div., Litton Sys., at 975.
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identities of chemicals to which the employees are exposed.8 0
The Board and the courts have developed guidelines for deter-
mining when a negotiator is required to disclose information."s
The duty to disclose is activated only upon a request for infor-
mation by the other negotiator.12 The information requested must
be necessary and relevant to the collective bargaining process. In
certain limited circumstances, a negotiator may be able to justify
a refusal to provide requested information if a legitimate and
substantial need for confidentiality is established, 4 or if the request
for information was made in bad faith.85
The NLRA speaks to the disclosure of information based on
facts, not intent. Thus, a negotiator's statement that "I do not
want to pay my employees more money" is based on nondisclosable
intent,8 6 whereas the statement "I cannot afford to pay my em-
ployees more money" is based on verifiable fact subject to disclo-
sure. s7
This legal emphasis on information as a key ingredient in the
negotiation process finds ample support in the theoretical literature
on negotiation. The exchange of information is the motor which
drives the negotiation process. Information is needed to formulate
one's own goals and strategies as well as to understand the other
party's goals. The broader and better the information base, the
more effectively a party can bargain.88
80. See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
81. For a complete discussion of the duty to furnish information within the context
of the NLRA, see J. O'REILLY, UNIONS' RIGHTS TO COMPANY INFORMATION (rev. ed. 1987).
82. See, e.g., A.H. Belo Corp. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 959, 971 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 1012,
1014 (3d Cir. 1952); United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 1018,
1026 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Boston Herald-Traveler
Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 627, 628 (1953), enforced, 210 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1954).
83. See, e.g., International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366, 371-72 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039 (1968); NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956, 958 (5th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955); Transport of N.J., 233 N.L.R.B. 694 (1977);
Ellsworth Sheet Metal, 224 N.L.R.B. 1506, 1509 (1976).
84. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 315 (1979).
85. See, e.g., Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1092-96 (5th Cir.
1981); Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir. 1972); Webster Outdoor
Advertising, 170 N.L.R.B. 1395, 1396 (1968).
86. Empire Terminal Warehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1359, 1360 (1965), enforced, 355
F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
87. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956). See also J. O'REILLY,
supra note 81, at 50-51.
88. See C. CRAvER, supra note 1, at 55-67; R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 1, at
41-57; P. GULLIVER, supra note 1, at 81-120; D. PRUITT, supra note 1, at 170-75;
MacDougall, Introduction to Negotiation Theory, 58 L. INST. J. 1434, 1434-35 (1984).
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The very importance of information to effective negotiation,
however, makes it a hostage to manipulation and concealment.
Information is used by both parties to formulate goals and strat-
egies as well as to evaluate their respective positions. A negotiator
can use the information regarding the other party's goals and
positions to devise effective threats or positional commitments and
thereby force the other party to agree to a minimally acceptable
agreement.19
The bargainer's need for information and reluctance to disclose
information (because it could be misused) creates a dilemma for
the negotiator:
It is this tension between information needs and information restraints
that constitutes the central motivational force for negotiators' behav-
ior .... As Ornati has aptly put it, "In all its aspects and at all periods,
negotiating is the process of 'finding out.' " How information is ex-
changed in these negotiations and why this exchange takes the complex
and tortured form it does is explained by the shared conflict between
the need for information and restraints against providing it."o
Thus, the negotiator cannot be completely open and honest because
of the risk of exploitation, yet a complete refusal to provide
information risks creating so much distrust in the other party that
a breakdown occurs in the negotiation process. 91
The NLRA deals with this information dilemma by imposing a
duty to disclose information relating to objective facts concerning
those subjects under discussion, while allowing negotiators to
conceal information relating to subjective intent and interests. As
noted by Zartman and Berman, concealment or distortion of
information can occur on three levels:
(l)reality of information ("We do have a nuclear capability," when we
really do not quite); (2)hierarchy of values ("We prefer this island to
that one but we will let you have this one if you give us enough
89. D. PRUITT, supra note 1, at 92-93; Kelley, supra note 41, at 57-58. For example,
in a negotiation where an amount of money is the only issue to be agreed upon (such as
bargaining over the price of an antique in a bazaar), the buyer might be willing to pay as
much as $2000. The buyer's satisfaction with the purchase, however, would increase
proportionately to the amount paid under $2000. The seller, on the other hand, is willing
to sell the antique for $1500, but like the buyer, would also proportionately increase
satisfaction by obtaining more money. If the buyer discovers that the seller will accept
$1500, the buyer can use this information to her advantage and to the seller's disadvantage
by stating that $1500 is the most she will pay (making a positional commitment) and
beginning to walk away (threatening to break off negotiations). See G. BELLOW & B.
MOULTON, supra note 1, at 32-33.
90. Kelley, supra note 41, at 58 (emphasis in original, citation omitted).
91. Rubin, Negotiation: An Introduction to Some Issues and Themes, 27 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 135, 137 (1983); P. GULLIVER, supra note 1, at 85.
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compensation," when we really don't care about this one but can't live
without that one); (3)degree of commitment ("We will bomb if you
don't agree but will give aid if you do," when we have no intention
either of bombing or of giving aid). 92
The NLRA ensures that information is exchanged and negotiation
can continue at least on the reality of information level.
F. Conclusion
Over the course of fifty years, legal principles have been devel-
oped requiring certain types of bargaining behavior from parties
negotiating in good faith. These principles, established through the
legal system under federal labor law, fit within the theoretical
structure of negotiation as developed by social scientists. Labor
law requires conduct of good-faith bargaining, fundamental for
all negotiation.
Adherence to these procedural guidelines has been proven not
only a theoretically sound practice for effective bargaining, but
also a practically effective means for negotiation. Labor and
management negotiators work within these strictures, arriving at
mutually agreeable collective bargaining contracts. There is no
evidence to suggest that the utilization of these procedural guide-
lines by negotiators involved in other types of bargaining would
not similarly lead to desirable results.
Communication, trust, and information are essential elements
of any negotiation. 93 The procedures developed under the NLRA
enhance communication through requiring in-person meetings of
sufficient length with negotiators of sufficient authority to discuss
and agree, create trust by requiring good faith, open-mindedness
and compliance with commitments, and facilitate the exchange of
information. Observance of the procedural rules by all negotiators
will promote effective and efficient negotiation.
92. See I. ZARTMAN & M. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 153.
93. Communication is at the heart of the negotiation process. While planning,
prework, evaluating the bargaining situation, and strategizing are all key elements
to the diagnosis and understanding of negotiation, communication is the central
instrumental process. Unless negotiators deal with one another strictly by trading
bids and offers on slips of paper, communication processes, both verbal and
nonverbal, are critical to the achievement of negotiating goals.
R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 1, at 157. See also I. ZARTMAN & M. BERMAN,
supra note I ("Some of the concern about personality and attitude traits comes down to
the matter of trust, one of the cardinal underlying characteristics of a fruitful negotiation."
Id. at 27.); P. GULLIVER, supra note I ("In essence-and this is to be emphasized-the
process of negotiation is one of information exchange and of consequent learning and
adjustment by the parties." Id. at 81.).

